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Abstract. The term ‘nano-divide’ has become a catch-phrase for describing 
various kinds of global nanotechnology inequities. However, there has been little 
in-depth exploration as to what the global nano-divide really means, and limited 
commentary on its early nature. Furthermore, the literature often presents countries 
from the Global South as ‘passive’ agents in global nanotechnology innovation – 
without the ability to develop endogenous nanotechnology capabilities. Yet others 
point to nanotechnology providing opportunities for the South to play new roles in 
the global research and development process. In this paper I report on the findings 
of a qualitative study that involved the perspectives of 31 Thai and Australian key 
informants, from a broad range of fields. The study was supplemented by a survey 
of approximately 10 per cent of the Thai nanotechnology research community at 
the time. I first explore how the global nano-divide is understood and the 
implication of the divide’s constructs in terms of the roles to be played by various 
countries in global nanotechnology innovation. I then explore the potential nature 
of Southern passivity and barriers and challenges facing Southern endogenous 
innovation as well as an in-depth consideration of the proposition that Southern 
countries could be ‘active’ agents in the nanotechnology process. I argue that it is 
the nano-divide relating to nanotechnology research and development capabilities 
that is considered fundamental to nanotechnology’s Southern outcomes. The 
research suggests that Southern countries will encounter many of the traditional 
barriers to engaging with emerging technology as well as some new barriers 
relating to the nature of nanotechnology itself. Finally, the research suggests that 
nanotechnology may offer new opportunities for Southern countries to enter the 
global research and development picture. 
Keywords. Nanotechnology; Global South; developing countries' innovation; 
Research and Development; Nano-divide; ethics 
Introduction 
The term ‘nano-divide’ has become a catch-phrase for describing various kinds of 
global nanotechnology inequities [See, for example, 1, 2-4]. Whilst common 
understandings appear to broadly relate to who will benefit from the fruits of 
nanotechnology innovation, there has been little in-depth exploration as to what the 
term ‘nano-divide’ really means. Moreover, despite early signs of surprisingly high 
levels of active Southern country engagement in nanotechnology [5, 6], little detail has 
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been garnered about how the nano-divide might play out. Questions remain, for 
example, about whether nanotechnology offers truly new challenges and opportunities 
for the South or whether the issues faced are generic and re-hashed. Or is the divide 
such a bad thing after all? Compounding these matters has been a significant lack of 
Southern input in international debates about the technology’s trajectory [6]. 
In this paper I aim to provide clarity about what the ‘nano-divide’ actually means, 
and explore two propositions relating to the role of Southern countries in global 
nanotechnology innovation: that the South will be ‘left behind’; and that 
nanotechnology provides opportunities for the South to play an active role in global 
innovation. 
1. Methods 
This paper reports on a 2004 qualitative study undertaken in Thailand and Australiaii. A 
group of key informants iii, sixteen from Thailand and fifteen from Australia, were 
interviewed about their understandings and perspectives relating to nanotechnology, as 
part of a wider study on nanotechnology and the South.  
Whilst the study sought exploratory, rather than representative, perspectives on 
how nanotechnology might be understood in the South, a key informant process was 
used to ensure a range of perspectives were considered [9]. Given the argument that 
studies assessing nanotechnology’s impacts relating to the South must go beyond 
consultations based purely on scientific perspectives [10], this study included 
interviewees with expertise in ethics, law, social science, science policy and 
development. Effort was made to ensure the involvement of people with experience 
across the ‘development process’, from grassroots activism through to government 
policymaking and industry leadership, with interviewees coming from academia, as 
well as private, government and non-government (NGO) sectors. Nineteen of the key 
informants (61%) were engaged in work that involved nanotechnology. All key 
informants from Thailand were Thai citizens. Tables 1 and 2 outline each key 
informant’s relevant position and affiliation, as of the time of their interview. 
Key informants were identified through web and literature searches as well as a 
simplified process of co-nomination [11]. 
Linguistic, financial and temporal limitations, as well as nanotechnology’s nascent 
stage at the time of the study, restricted the ability for wider public engagement, 
particularly outside of Bangkok, Thailand. Despite every effort to ensure diversity, the 
majority of Thai key informants spoke fluent English and had, at some stage, received 
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Table 1. Thai Interviewees 
ame Position, Affiliation 
Sector 
Gothom Arya Chairman, Appropriate Technology Association, Thailand 
NGO 
Tanit Changthavorn 
Intellectual Property Specialist, National Centre for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, National Science and 
Technology Development Agency 
Government 
Tawatchai 
Charinpanitkul 
Associate Dean for Research Affairs, Faculty of Engineering, 
Chulalongkorn University 
Academic 
Suwabun 
Chirachanchai 
Associate Professor, Petroleum and Petrochemical College, 
Chulalongkorn University 
Academic 
Nares Damrongchai 
Policy Researcher, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Centre 
for Technology Foresight 
Government 
Joydeep Dutta 
Associate Professor, Microelectronics, Asian Institute of 
Technology 
Academic 
Worsak Kanok-
Nukulchai 
Professor, Structural Engineering, Asian Institute of 
Technology 
Academic 
Promboon 
Panitchpakdi 
Director, Raks Thai Foundation 
NGO 
Pakdee Pothisiri Senior Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Health 
Government 
Pinit Ratanakul 
Executive Director, College of Religious Studies, Mahidol 
University 
Academic 
Pathom 
Sawanpanyalert 
National Professional Officer (Health Systems Development), 
World Health Organisation, Thailand 
NGO 
Sirirurg Songsivilai Chairman & Co-Founder, Innova Biotechnology Co. Ltd 
Private 
Nadda Sriyabhaya President, Stop-Tuberculosis Association, Thailand 
NGO 
Wiwut 
Tanthapanichakoon 
Director, National Nanotechnology Centre, National Science 
and Technology Development Agency 
Government 
Pairash 
Thajchayapong 
Advisor to the Prime Minister on Science and Technology 
Government 
Yongyuth 
Yuthavong 
Senior Researcher, National Centre for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology, National Science and Technology Development 
Agency 
Government 
 
Table 2. Australian Interviewees 
ame Position, Affiliation 
Sector 
Leigh Berwick Investment Manager (Nanotechnology), Invest Australia 
Government 
Vijoleta Braach 
Maksvytis 
General Manager, Global Aid, Commonwealth Scientific 
Industrial Development Organisation 
Government 
Paul Bryce 
Director, APACE-VFEG (Appropriate Technology for 
Community and Environment Inc – Village First Electrification 
Group) 
NGO 
Melinda Cooper 
Research Fellow, Department of Sociology, Macquarie 
University 
Academic 
Bruce Cornell Senior Vice President and Chief Scientist, AMBRI Pty Ltd 
Private 
Patricia Coyle 
Medical Doctor, Department of Anaesthesia, Royal Prince 
Alfred Hospital 
Government 
Peter Deutschmann 
Director, Australian International Health Institute, University of 
Melbourne 
NGO 
Mike Ford 
Associate Director, Institute for Nanoscale Technology, 
University of Technology, Sydney 
Academic 
Mike Lynskey Chief Executive Officer, The Fred Hollows Foundation 
NGO 
Benno Radt 
Research Fellow, Department of Chemical and Biomolecular 
Engineering, University of Melbourne 
Academic 
Michael Selgelid 
Sesqui Lecturer in Bioethics, Faculty of Medicine, University 
of Sydney 
Academic 
Greg Tegart 
Executive Advisor, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Centre 
for Technology Foresight 
Government 
Chris Warris Researcher, Australian Academy of Science 
NGO 
Terry Turney 
Director, Nanotechnology Centre, Commonwealth Scientific 
Industrial Development Organisation 
Government 
John Weckert 
Professor, Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, 
Charles Sturt University Wagga 
Academic 
 
The study was supplemented by a two-page, mailed survey to members of the Thai 
nanotechnology research community. Members of this community were identified 
through available literature, particularly via leads arising from the 2004 document: 
“Final Report: Survey for Current Situation of Nanotechnology Researchers and R&D 
in Thailand”, published by researchers at Chulalongkorn University [12]. The survey 
received a high return rate, with participants constituting approximately 10 percent of 
the Thai nanotechnology research community at the time
iv
. 
A study of a small number of key informants and nanotechnology practitioners in 
Thailand can in no way be seen as indicative of attitudes across the non-homogenous 
South, particularly given Thailand’s lack of a colonial history. However, Thai 
perspectives can be useful for exploring and considering nanotechnology and the 
South, given the situation Thailand faces in terms of both development and 
nanotechnology.  
Thailand is classified by the United Nations Development Program as a “middle 
income country” [13] and is ranked 74th out of 175 countries on the Human 
Development Indexv [14]. In recent decades it has experienced remarkable progress in 
human development [13]. However, Thailand’s greater population continues to face 
significant challenges. As of 2004, 21% of the Thai population earned less than $2 a 
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day [15], whilst financial inequality had increased over the past 40 years, particularly 
between urban and rural areas [13]. Stark inequities are also evident in the distributed 
burden of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and general access to health services [13].  Various 
populations still suffer from very high levels of child malnutrition and maternal 
mortality, whilst overuse of pesticides is a threat to many in rural areas [13]. Despite 
the fact that the vast majority of Thais live in rural locations, the country is 
experiencing rapid urbanisation as well as an ageing population [14]. 
In terms of it engagement with emerging technology, Thailand has supportive 
infrastructure and strong hopes for biotechnology R&D [16]. In an early study of 
Southern nanotechnology capabilities, Thailand was identified as a “middle ground” 
Southern country [5]. This analysis is supported by early evidence of nanotechnology 
R&D [12, 17-20], including the establishment of a national centre [21] and 
development of a national nanotechnology strategy [22]. Just as Thailand faces 
significant challenges with biotechnology innovation [18], so too do people claim 
Thailand faces significant challenges for nanotechnology innovation [19, 23]. From the 
perspective of ELSI, Thailand has a history of controversy in biotechnology, ranging 
from issues of morality [24] and environmental concerns [25], through to issues of 
intellectual property such as  ‘biopiracy’ [26, 27] and compulsory licensing [28]. Yet 
already, the ELSI of Thai nanotechnology has created controversy around the issue of 
‘atomically modified organisms’ [29]. 
Given the role of the North in shaping and driving debates about nanotechnology 
and the South, the value of simultaneously considering Northern perspectives must not 
be underestimated. Australian perspectives can act as a useful reference point given the 
country has been firmly entrenched in international nanotechnology debates having 
developed the world’s first ‘nanomachine’ in 1997 [30]. However, as of 2004, 
Australia also lacked a formal national nanotechnology initiative and its global output 
was below expected levels [31]. Furthermore, Australia has also faced a slow uptake of 
engagement with ELSI debates in areas such as health and safety [32], and low levels 
of public understanding and knowledge about nanotechnology [33]. 
Considering the importance of the interviewee’s own framework of meanings, the 
31 interviews were semi-structured, which allows for a broad framing but individual 
divergence [34]. Each interview lasted between 20 and 80 minutes, was face-to-facevi, 
and interviewees were offered professional translation services. All data was analysed 
using NVivo™ software, noted for its ability to assist in developing an emergent 
analysis [36]. 
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2. Results 
In section 2.1 I explore how the nano-divide is understood and the implication of 
the divide’s constructs in terms of the roles to be played by various countries in global 
nanotechnology innovation. 
The literature often presents Southern countries as ‘passive’ agents in global 
nanotechnology innovation – with an inability to develop endogenous nanotechnology 
capabilities. In section 2.2 I explore the nature of that passivity and barriers and 
challenges facing Southern endogenous innovation. 
Others in the literature point to nanotechnology providing opportunities for the 
South to play new roles in the global R&D process. In section 2.3 I entertain the 
proposition of Southern countries as ‘active’ agents in the nanotechnology process. 
2.1 Understanding the ano-Divide and its Constructs 
Interviewees regularly referred to the term ‘nano-divide’ but assumed its meaning and 
knowledge of how it is constructed are commonly understood. Given the apparent 
difference in understandings that emerged, in this section I seek to piece together 
interviewee comments to establish some relevant clarity. The first part considers how 
the term ‘nano-divide’ is interpreted and understood. The second explores some early 
characteristics of the nanotechnology innovation divide in terms of its leaders and those 
‘left behind’. Addressing these two points establishes a context and framework for my 
assessment, in this paper, of Southern roles in the global nanotechnology innovation. 
Generally speaking, the literature does not clarify what is meant by a ‘nano-
divide’. Yet it is clear that, for interviewees, the term ‘nano-divide’ can have two 
different meanings. The first, that I term the ‘nano-innovation divide’, refers to inequity 
based on where knowledge is generated and retained and a country’s capacity to 
engage in these two processes. Tegart presented this divide as one between the 
“information rich and information poor…” [37]. Those on the ‘leading’ side of this 
divide are seen as able to actively contribute to and direct nanotechnology’s trajectory, 
whilst those who are ‘left behind’ are seen as playing passive roles, unable to exert 
influence over any sphere of nanotechnology’s global trajectory. The second meaning, 
that I term the ‘nano-orientation divide’, refers to inequity based on the areas in which 
nanotechnology research is targeted, as compared to the areas in which it would 
address basic human needs. In this sense, Arya spoke of a differentiation between 
nanotechnology addressing ‘real’ and ‘felt’ needs [38]. For many, this translated into a 
belief that nanotechnology would be governed more by market push- rather than social 
pull-factors. 
Whilst the divides differ in their nature, where research is targeted is often initially 
dependent on where knowledge is being generated and retained. Given that most of the 
world’s research into emerging technology occurs in the North, comments on the 
orientation divide generally related to global inequities in terms of limited Northern 
research focused on Southern problems. However, the prospect of the South as active 
agents in global nanotechnology innovation prompts additional consideration for 
inequities in the orientation of Southern generated knowledge – a matter I will explore 
in a future paper. 
According to the interviewees, there is an increasing concentration of 
nanotechnology R&D generation and ownership in the hands of “limited leading 
countries” [39]. These countries were classified as ‘leaders’ largely because of the high 
levels of early nanotechnology investment [37, 40, 41] and also happened to be some 
of the more wealthy countries in the world [42]. Leaders in nanotechnology innovation 
were said to includevii the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, Germany, Australia, Sweden, the U.K., 
France, Switzerland and Hong Kongviii. 
Given certain countries are leaders of nanotechnology innovation, it stands to 
reason that  certain countries be ‘left behind’ [43-47]. The previously outlined pressure 
to be at the forefront of nanotechnology innovation is often driven by a belief that if a 
country neglects nanotechnology it will be in an unenviable position later on [47, 48], 
having to try to “catch-up” [46]. According to Tanthapanichakoon, even a country with 
endogenous nanotechnology capabilities could fall behind if it did not seek to 
constantly develop its research position [47]. The insinuation here is that, rather than all 
countries gaining from nanotechnology, no matter what the nature of their engagement, 
those that do not develop and maintain competitive innovative capabilities will actually 
lose out. Furthermore, as shall be explored in section 2.2, there is a perceived potential 
for nanotechnology to actually reinforce the underdevelopment of some countries by 
creating greater technological dependency [38, 41, 49]. 
The proposition that countries will play different ‘roles’ in global nanotechnology 
innovation prompts a greater exploration of exactly what kind of roles are envisaged 
for the South. Will the South be left behind by nanotechnology or will the situation 
present new opportunities allowing Southern countries to become agents in global 
nanotechnology innovation? As shall be seen in sections 2.2 and 2.3, this question 
leads to an exploration of the barriers and possibilities for Southern nanotechnology 
innovation. 
Four key issues relating to barriers and possibilities were presented as largely 
determining Southern roles in global nanotechnology innovation, these being “their 
understanding, their commitment, the resources and infrastructure” [43]. Whilst many 
perspectives, particularly Australian, went beyond considering the development 
‘problem’ as one solely influenced by issues of domestic Southern capacity by also 
looking at global externalities and contexts, these four issues form the crux of my 
discussion in this paper. 
2.2 The South Left Behind 
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 China was not considered a nanotechnology ‘leader’, although its grouping with the 
North, in terms of nanotechnology prowess, will be discussed later. 
Interviewees presented a number of different explanations for why Southern countries 
might be left behind in nanotechnology’s global development. In the first part of this 
section I look at some of the envisaged scenarios, exploring varying levels of 
engagement and different kinds of roles. I then progresses to addressing the underlying 
assumption – that the South cannot play an active role in global nanotechnology 
innovation – by exploring the perceived challenges to developing innovative 
capabilities. 
For some Australian interviewees, the possibility for nanotechnology’s 
development in the South was either non-existent, a “contradiction in terms”[50] or 
“[not] a direct link, by any means” [51]. Those who struggled to see any link suggested 
that nanotechnology was irrelevant to the South and that not only was endogenous 
R&D unlikely, but that they may not even play the role of ‘recipient’, given that 
“…existing, basic, often very cheap, sometimes even free, technologies or medicines, 
are not available in developing countries…” [52].  
However, many of the interviewees, led by the Australians, saw the link between 
nanotechnology and the South via some form of passive diffusion, where the role of the 
South was as ‘recipient’, rather than innovator, particularly in the “very, very poor 
countries in Africa” [37]. The common implication was that nanotechnology will most 
likely reach the South as a result of Northern influence. Selgelid’s response highlighted 
this mindset when he commented, “nanotechnology would be great if someone really 
made it and provided it to developing countries” [52]. Bryce’s reasoning was along 
similar lines as he saw diffusion coming via a “serendipitous process” [53].  
Northern-dictated aid was seen as likely mechanism for Southern engagement with 
nanotechnology. Berwick, a policy officer with Invest Australia, saw potential for 
nanotechnology to be incorporated in “world aid programs and assistance programs to 
help developing nations just help themselves develop further” [46]. Similarly, Cornell 
referred to potential areas of application in U.N. aid packages or U.S. or European 
initiatives operating in the South [51]. Australian interviewees also saw the potential 
for international aid organisations to invest in Southern nanotechnology, commonly 
citing organisations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Braach-Myksvitis 
noted that this kind of activity has already commenced, with the Global Research 
Allianceix having been approached by a number of Northern foundations wishing to 
ensure the benefits of nanotechnology reach the South in this way [54]. Damrongchai, a 
Thai technology policy officer, agreed that there was potential for nanotechnology to 
enter the South via aid, citing potential applications such as single-life diagnostic kits, 
and methods by which to increase food preservation [39]. Damrongchai’s comments 
were distinct, with most Thai interviewees ambivalent about nanotechnology’s 
potential delivery through aid and development assistance, having given little 
consideration to the idea. Panitchpakdi was one who spoke about the potential for 
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greater Southern dependency as a result of becoming recipients of nanotechnology-
based aid whereby it would “…all depend on the countries that are advanced [if they] 
are willing to share” [55]. For Damrongchai, the idea of a Northern-controlled situation 
raised considerable concerns about donors exerting political influence and impressing 
conditionality upon Southern recipient countries [39]. 
As an extension of aid, technology transfer was also discussed as a mechanism by 
which the South’s role would remain passivex. Some interviewees suggested that, with 
the right education and training, nanotechnology could be transposed from the North to 
the South [37, 53]. Importing products and technologies was viewed as a possible 
means of engagement for those countries without nanotechnology R&D capabilities 
[38]. Kanok-Nuckulchai believed that less developed countries, although unable to 
“build technology themselves” even if they commence nanotechnology activities now, 
can still start accumulating the knowledge and, once they have sufficient human 
resources and infrastructure, “…can absorb and transfer some of technology…” [44].  
Others saw this form of technology as entrenching the passivity of the South in 
global nanotechnology processes via a continuation of Southern technological 
dependency [56]. Some interviewees envisaged this dependency in terms of a ‘trickle-
down’ of nanotechnology from the North to countries without endogenous innovative 
capabilities [57]. Cornell, for example, imagined the South would only benefit “as a 
consequence” of ‘spin-offs’ from Northern nanotechnology advances in areas such as 
water desalination, cheap nutritional foods and low cost fuels [51]. Weckert was 
similarly cynical about the way in which many Southern countries would engage with 
nanotechnology, suggesting that until developing countries “…get a bit more 
economically advanced”, their engagement may be limited to Northern companies who 
“see some big economic advantage” of distributing nanotechnology in the South [58]. 
Tegart added that a number of U.S. companies might already be viewing the South as a 
“potential market” for Northern products [37]. In this respect, a number of Thai 
interviewees confirmed that ‘nano-products’ have already entered the Thai market [39, 
59]. What emerged in the interviews was a strong fear of ‘import dependency’, with 
some saying that Thailand could end up “…buying a lot of things” [49] and ‘losing a 
lot of currency’ by buying-in high-cost technology through both products and services 
[44, 49]. Furthermore, Thai interviewees constantly referred to an “import threat” [41], 
with one practitioner worried about a flood of “cheap products from China” and 
Charinpanitkul adding that the danger lies in imported nanotechnology products 
entering the Thai market and the population ignoring domestically-produced products 
once they “…get[s] used to those [international] products” [41]. For Damrongchai, it is 
this continual buying of products from the North that perpetuates underdevelopment 
[39]. 
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Another kind of passive role presented the South as ‘nano-manufacturers’. Thai 
interviewees saw a role for the South to “partner in the manufacturing stage” with 
Northern counterparts [43]. Weckert suggested this was merely the outsourcing of 
work by companies in the North [58]. Dutta saw the move to outsourced nano-
manufacturing that would occur in Southern countries as a natural progression, 
explaining: 
for niche products, [where the] investments are lower, they [developed 
countries] will have to transfer the technology where you need more labour, 
where you need larger space to manufacture. You cannot keep it in developed 
nations, it is too expensive… [60]. 
Others agreed it likely that countries with strong nanotechnology programs would 
exploit countries playing passive roles in its development [37, 61]. There was 
recognition that Northern nanotechnology R&D partnerships with the South would 
seek to benefit from reduced costs [53] and lower levels of regulation in the South [51]. 
Ratanakul was sceptical that such partnerships would allow Southern countries to play 
an active role in global nanotechnology innovation, saying: 
The problem is these Western scientists are doing research for their own 
benefit… When they finish the[ir] research they go back and then they create 
new technology, based on the research, and they sell it [to] us [57]. 
The suggestion here is that the North will value-add to nanotechnology products 
(possibly manufactured in the South) and that those not absorbed by Northern markets 
or considered ‘too risky’, will be off-loaded to the South, as often happens with 
pharmaceuticals. In this light, Deutchmann spoke of his concern that “….junk products 
would be dumped at a cheap price on the developing world…” [40], with Cornell 
believing that many developing countries will take “…whatever is available at a 
reasonable price” [51]. 
At the heart of nearly all of these scenarios is the assumption that nanotechnology 
R&D, and therefore a potentially active role in global nanotechnology innovation, is 
limited to the developed countries and beyond the realm of developing countries. 
Turney and Berwick respectively spoke of a “cultural perception” and “natural 
tendency” to expect that nanotechnology will be a ‘developed world technology’ [46, 
48]. Interviewees such as Chirachanchai provided support for this hypothesis by 
speaking of the “advanced countries” assuming leadership roles in global 
nanotechnology innovation [59]. Additionally, there was a belief that “developing 
countries are going to miss the boat… [and not take] advantage of nanotechnology to 
exploit their local, competitive advantages…” [48]. Dutta said that if Southern 
nanotechnology is to face barriers they will be barriers of Northern perception, 
commenting: “…some of the people may think ‘what the hell can you do in 
nanotechnology in Thailand’” [60]. But there was also evidence of domestic challenges 
relating to Southern perceptions. Kanok-Nukulchai, amongst others, noted that his 
initial impressions about developing nanotechnology in a country such as Thailand 
were “distant”, with ventures into research feeling “contradictory” [42]. Others spoke 
of the barrier of internal cynicism. They suggested that even in a country making 
efforts to become active in global nanotechnology innovation, there is potential for 
people to think “it is just too difficult...” [48], or that the research is “too late” to catch 
the North, leading to the cessation of activity [59]. 
Driving these perceptions was a belief that “in-house” development of 
nanotechnology is too difficult for many Southern countries, given the weak capacity 
for innovation [49]. A range of factors were presented as challenges to developing 
capacity, commencing with issues of Southern nanotechnology awareness and 
commitment, moving to issues of basic capacity through to challenges in growing and 
maintaining competitive R&D capabilities. In explaining the challenges to Southern 
countries playing active roles in global nanotechnology innovation, Thai interviewees 
often used examples from the Thai experience. 
Preceding the issue of basic capacity was a belief that a lack of awareness, 
understanding and commitment could inhibit the ability for Southern countries to enter 
global nanotechnology innovation. In this light, a number of Australian interviewees 
said that the initial barriers to Southern innovation include awareness of what 
nanotechnology is actually about [61] and recognition of its opportunities and future 
importance [37, 45]. This lack of awareness was compounded by poor understanding, 
particularly amongst Southern leaders, that Tegart saw as a major challenge for the 
South [37]. In contrast, Thajchayapong suggested that there is a great deal of public 
awareness around nanotechnology and a general acceptance of nanotechnology’s 
merits amongst policymakers in the E.U., Japan and the U.S. [62]. 
According to many interviewees, lack of awareness and understanding about 
nanotechnology fits within a bigger picture in the South where nanotechnology 
innovation is ‘prioritised out’ by more immediate needs [48] to do with the “basic 
requirements of life” [51]. In this respect, Kanok-Nukulchai explained that 
nanotechnology is perceived as a “luxurious” investment, particularly in light of its 
embryonic state of development and the long-term nature of ‘returns’ [42]. 
Following on from this, some interviewees saw a challenge for the South in 
gaining political commitment for nanotechnology [37, 55]. This could translate to 
inadequate resource allocation [37, 63], with a particular concern that Southern 
nanotechnology R&D would be under-funded [37, 45, 55, 60, 63, 64]. As 
Tanthapanichakoon noted about the Thai situation, “…we still do not have a very 
strong budget or input into nanotechnology” [47]. This perspective was supported by a 
number of Thai nanotechnology practitioners who claimed low budgets were inhibiting 
the progress of their work. 
In addition to awareness, understanding and commitment, “…so many other 
challenges” were seen as reducing the ability to develop nanotechnology capabilities 
[65]. As Warris noted, “...[developing countries] have got to get certain things in order 
before they can get into more high-tech applications, such as nanotechnology” [45]. In 
this light, interviewees pointed to challenges with respect to both basic knowledge and 
capacity.  
In terms of basic knowledge, there was a belief that Thailand lacks the 
fundamental knowledge to engage in nanotechnology [43]. Chirachanchai elaborated 
by saying that, in the past, “understanding at the molecular level has been neglected” 
[59]. According to others, the fact that “the science is not quite there” [62] was 
believed to place the country “a bit far behind from the very beginning” [59]. More 
generally, Cornell was sceptical about the ability for developing countries to lead 
innovation, saying: “the idea of them being at the frontier of any of these areas is 
somewhat difficult to perceive, given the fact that it is born, really, at the very cutting-
edge of developed country science…” [51]. 
With respect to basic capacity, interviewees specifically referred to ‘human 
resources’ as the “biggest concern” [39] and the “greatest obstacle” [41] to Southern 
nanotechnology innovation. In this respect, Thailand was already said to be 
experiencing a shortfall of researchers [44, 49, 60], compacted by the belief that 
Thailand will face difficulties in finding people with an ‘interest’ in nanotechnology 
[38, 63]. But Lynskey suggested that this lack of a “critical mass” of relevant human 
resources actually means that the idea of a country such as Eritrea developing 
endogenous nanotechnology capabilities is “completely unrealistic” [65]. These 
challenges were placed in the broader context of a general shortage of science and 
technology researchers in the South xi  [47] and critical weaknesses in terms of 
educational capacity [37]. Cornell said that this will be a particular barrier for Southern 
nanotechnology, given the lack of “long-standing commitment to education” in areas 
such as the molecular sciences that form the basis for developing nanotechnology 
capabilities [51]. On the other hand, strong levels of human resources were seen as the 
backbone to nanotechnology innovation in a number of Northern countries such as 
Japan and Taiwan [42, 62]. 
Yet there was a belief that shortfalls in the specific kind of human resources 
required to drive nanotechnology innovation will mean even greater challenges for the 
South [64]. Dutta spoke of particular Thai shortfalls with respect to those with basic 
knowledge in quantum physics and chemistry, or those with an ability to shift into 
nanotechnology from other fields [60]. For Turney, this was part of a general problem 
in terms of the “level of education” of current or potential practitioners within the 
South [48]. In addition to researchers, technicians were seen to be “critical people… in 
the exploitation of much of this technology” and a further area in which the South was 
viewed as being in a much weaker position than the North [37]. Kanok-Nukulchai 
noted that it may take some time to cultivate the expertise nanotechnology demands 
[42]. 
Furthermore, interviewees spoke of a strong potential for Southern nanotechnology 
researchers to be drawn to the North via the commonly expressed ‘brain-drain’ 
phenomena [37, 61]. Brain drain was seen as a threat to retaining workers in a country 
such as Thailand if it did not have enough nanotechnology infrastructure and facilities, 
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with a belief that the “best brains” would start to look to Singapore, the U.S. or Europe 
[39]. Others, including several Thai nanotechnology practitioners, saw this as part of 
the bigger challenge of creating a ‘research culture’ and general support for Thailand’s 
scientific community. These challenges were seen as presenting a significant barrier to 
developing and retaining a critical mass of researchers in the South [37, 39, 61]. 
Ratanakul believed this was already a major challenge for Thailand, stating that “…the 
government has not been thinking of the measures to prevent the well trained Thai 
scientists from being lured away by affluent nations… [57]. 
The other threat posed by brain drain relates to the challenges of re-integrating 
returned researchers into Southern contexts. Charipanikul believed that it would be 
quite difficult for Thais with nanotechnology expertise to find employment upon return 
from overseas work or training [41]. Dutta explained that whilst “…the Thai 
government has spent a lot of funds to train people abroad…” their adaptation time 
upon return is too long “…because there are no active groups working here”[60]. 
In addition to human resources, many saw infrastructure as a basic requirement, 
and thereby major challenge, for the Southern development of nanotechnology 
capabilities. Interviewees first discussed problems with the amount of infrastructure 
available, referring only to ‘hard’ infrastructure in terms of equipment and 
instrumentation. Like a number of others, Dutta believed that “…nanotechnology needs 
quite a bit of infrastructure”, given the scale on which the research occurs [60]. But 
Cornell noted more strongly that if a country wants to seriously engage in 
nanotechnology R&D then “you could fill telephone books with the kind of 
infrastructure that you need” [51]. In elaborating, Cornell outlined the need for:  
an ability to work with ceramics, with plastics, organic chemistry development, 
with fine metals, thin-film deposition, you must have electronic foundries… 
you need everything that currently supports a modern industrial economy and 
that goes from screen-printing, paints, chemistries, lubricants, polymers, 
waxes, solvents, all of the moulding industries, the etching industries, 
electrochemical industries, [51]. 
In this respect, interviewees referred to the “limited capabilities” within the South [37, 
47]. According to Cornell, developing countries have  “…not yet advanced to the point 
whereby this kind of equipment, this kind of capability, is naturally part of their world” 
[51]. For Cornell, this was partially explained by the common, developing country 
absence of a military industrial complex that he saw as the foundation for driving 
innovation; pointing to the case of the U.S. where he saw nanotechnology driven in this 
manner [51]. 
The second aspect of infrastructure requirements relates to the quality and cost of 
instrumentation. Practitioners specifically mentioned the essential need for observation 
and characterisation instrumentation such as Tunnelling Electron Microscopes and 
thin-film coaters. In this respect, Thailand was seen to lack some of the required 
equipment [60], with Kanok-Nukulchai noting a perception that the technology is too 
advanced:  
…when we talk about nanotechnology most people think… it is something we 
cannot see, something that need[s] a lot of high-tech equipment and when we 
look back at Thailand we are not that advanced in terms of technology [42]. 
Prohibitive costs were presented as the main barrier to the acquisition of such 
instrumentation [46], with Cornell believing that nanotechnology requires “a fairly 
large investment in fairly expensive equipment” [51]. 
In addition to challenges with respect to basic capabilities, interviewees spoke of 
challenges relating to the development and maintenance of competitive, 
nanotechnology R&D capabilities. There was a strong belief, for example, that access 
to appropriate instrumentation was a key barrier to the development of Southern 
nanotechnology strength. Radt believed many of the developing countries actually have 
the instruments required to undertake nanotechnology R&D but saw the barrier more as 
a matter of access to, and maintenance of, these instruments [64]. Dutta partly agreed, 
saying of the existing instrumentation, much of it is “underused” [60]. 
The challenges around developing basic nanotechnology capabilities suggest 
coordination and strategic planning is required. However, coordination is another area 
in which interviewees saw challenges for Thailand, with a genuine concern that 
research will be “unfocused and resource[s] will be scattered” [42]. Chirachanchai, for 
example, saw problems in ensuring that each research effort was part of an overall 
strategy for Thai nanotechnology [59]. In this light, Tanthapanichakoon highlighted 
that Thailand “…does not have a national strategy and all the labs, or centres, are 
working on their own interests or on their own subjects, without coordination…” [47]. 
Furthermore, Tanthapanichakoon said that Thailand suffers from a significant 
breakdown in communication between many of the government agencies that would 
need to be working together when it comes to nanotechnology innovation [47]. 
Accompanying coordination of research is the Southern challenge of strategic 
planning. Tegart believed the initial planning difficulty is in assessing capabilities and 
then selecting focused areas for research [37]. Dutta’s concern, that people talk 
generally about nanotechnology without a concentrated focus in any particular 
direction [60], was seen as part of a bigger fear that Thai nanotechnology lacks a clear 
and comprehensive vision for the future [59]. 
But, developing focused nanotechnology research can be made more difficult if the 
ability to develop knowledge is restricted by nanotechnology innovation’s global 
leaders. Interviewees strongly argued that some of the greatest barriers to Southern 
innovation relate to “who’s involved and actually creating the technologies” [56] and, 
stemming from this, the “big issue” [39] of control over intellectual property rights. 
Concerns about the inhibitive impact of Northern nanotechnology patenting upon 
Southern attempts to develop innovative capabilities were seen to be uniquely 
enhanced given nanotechnology relates to the fundamental building blocks of all 
material things [39]. Added to this, the potential disappearance of the ‘cost-barrier’ for 
nanotechnology R&D (as shall be discussed in section 2.3), makes the issue of patent 
control “extremely important” because “…the powerbroker will be the knowledge” 
[54]. Furthermore, a major concern held by interviewees was that a great deal of 
nanotechnology patenting would be speculative in order to claim future applications. 
Pothsiri was worried that “a Western country, particularly in the private sector… may 
try to play around with this kind of thing without making any attempt to find a new 
innovation” [66]. Additionally, a number of interviewees said their concerns lay with 
the increasing move towards, or ambiguous nature of, “process” patentsxii in light of a 
greater research focus on atomic self-assembly [52, 68]. In these respects, 
nanotechnology was seen as leading to corporate monopolies [57], locking up research 
in the North and thereby providing “…another key barrier to developing country 
uptake” [54] by blocking potential avenues for Southern R&D [56].  
One Thai interviewee spoke very strongly about how nanotechnology patenting 
will maintain and promote the technological divide through ongoing oppression of the 
South. Arya presented intellectual property rights as the “new economic power… [and] 
new instrument of domination”, with patent holders often over-exploiting their position 
of strength [38]. He went on to say that the control of proprietary knowledge is driving 
greater oppression through a divide that, in addition to being technological, includes 
an:  
…economic, social and also political divide, because those who have the new 
technologies will also invest, not only for the products to serve mankind but 
the products which can be used for domination, for hegemony, weapons of 
new kinds and so on and so forth [38]. 
General concerns were also held for the ability for Southern countries to translate 
nanotechnology research into patented knowledge. Charinpanitkul said that 
nanotechnology patenting in Thailand “…will be a big obstacle” given patent 
understanding, even in the university, is insufficient [41]. Added to this, Changthavorn 
pointed specifically to a lack of nanotechnology understanding amongst Thai lawyers 
[68]. Charinpanitkul saw the lack of knowledge as severe and inhibitive, highlighting, 
with respect to nanotechnology patent applications, “…we do not know even what style 
or what wording we should add…” [41]. 
A contributing factor to weak Southern patenting and another major challenge to 
the South playing active roles in global nanotechnology innovation is the potentially 
poor level of private sector engagement with nanotechnology R&D [48]. 
Thajchayapong said that the science of nanotechnology actually demands greater 
participation from industry [62], with private sector participation suggested to be a 
crucial driver of early nanotechnology success in Japan and Taiwan [41]. 
Aside from foreseeable financial ‘return’, available financing and other financial 
incentives were seen as the initial drivers of private sector engagement in 
nanotechnology. However, building on earlier concerns about a general lack of 
                                                           
xii “A claim or claims to a process for the manufacture of a product, which may itself be 
the subject of a patent though it does not necessarily have to be” [67]. 
funding, there was a belief that risks, particularly those associated with intellectual 
property, could make access to nanotechnology finance and capital a serious problem 
in some of the Southern countries [48]. In this light, many saw the countries of the 
North in comparatively strong positions. Tanthapanichakoon, for example, suggested 
that a country such as the U.S. is in “the best position” when it comes to 
nanotechnology R&D largely because of the “good system of venture capital” in place 
[47]. 
A second challenge facing the development of Southern-owned proprietary 
knowledge is the difficulty of technology transfer from academia to industry. The 
initial problem is that in a country such as Thailand a great deal of the nanotechnology 
research is ‘fundamental’ rather than ‘applied’. As Tegart noted, whilst there are some 
Thai researchers completing PhD’s in nanotechnology “they are rather pure science 
topics… and not very focused on practical and applied areas….” [37]. Secondly, Thai 
nanotechnology practitioner responses demonstrated weak professional links between 
academia and industry. Thajyapong said these weak links were most visible in the poor 
levels of communication about nanotechnology between industry, government 
policymakers, researchers and academia [62]. Finally, there was a belief that Southern 
firms are limited in their ability to absorb nanotechnology R&D from academia [66]. 
Even leveraging from international partnerships to overcome capacity issues 
encountered skepticism. Interviewees highlighted barriers in terms of the lack of 
Southern infrastructure [51] and massive amounts of competition to be “at the 
forefront” in nanotechnology [42]. To elaborate, Tanthapanichakoon used the example 
of the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation of Japan 
whose policy, in terms of collaborative research, is “…no grants at all in 
nanotechnology field[s]” [47]. 
It is important to note that most of the challenges raised for the South to play an 
active role in global nanotechnology innovation were not considered specific to 
nanotechnology but, rather, generic to all high-tech fields [64]. Some of the examples 
presented include: the low levels of investment in emerging technologies [55]; the 
Northern concentration of proprietary knowledge [47] – with nanotechnology said to 
raise issues similar to those at the forefront of the biotechnology debate in this respect 
[39]; there were also shared problems in the hesitation of the private sector to engage in 
nanotechnology R&D and difficulties associated with technology transfer [37]. 
If many of the challenges are generic, is there anything to suggest that global roles 
in emerging innovation will change at the hands of nanotechnology? Will this divide be 
any different to preceding technological divides? Selgelid thought not, saying he saw 
no reason why the general situation relating to inequality would be any different for 
nanotechnology: 
The North-South divide is really complex and I do not see why there should 
be anything special or unique about the North-South divide or rich-poor divide 
as far as nanotechnology [is concerned]. I would imagine the same kind of 
dynamics that are driving inequality in all kinds of other domains would just 
apply to this domain, as well… [52]. 
Others were concerned that nanotechnology’s innovation divide could be 
“exaggerated” [40] and worse than the divide currently witnessed with ICT [58]. This 
view was partially justified by a belief that nanotechnology enters a platform of 
existing and widening divides [37, 51, 58], particularly those for  biotechnology and 
ICT [47]. In this light, Yuthavongxiii saw potential for an extreme shifting of R&D 
concentration away from developing countries, saying that nanotechnology R&D is 
“moving too fast” for many developing countries to “…really capture the benefits 
fully” [49], with Sawanpanyalert adding that Northern countries are in a much more 
favourable position to respond and adapt their capabilities [37, 43, 47]. However, as 
shall be explored in section 2.3, others saw nanotechnology presenting new 
opportunities for the South to play an active role in global innovation. 
2.3 ew Opportunities 
Whilst previous arguments suggest that an active role in nanotechnology innovation is 
beyond the South, others suggest that the barriers are more matters of perception [48, 
60] and that nanotechnology can also be viewed as an opportunity for the South [49]. 
As noted in previous research, despite seemingly universal understandings, 
nanotechnology conjures a range of perceptions, some of which fail to consider 
nanotechnology in some of its more simple forms [7]. ‘Further consideration’ is 
suggested as leading to more ‘circumspect’ perspectives [37], with Selgelid’s responses 
highlighting this point - after considering the issues in greater detail, Selgelid stated 
“…there is the possibility that nanotechnology is not out of the reach, or should not be 
out of the reach of developing countries” [52]. In this respect, a number of 
interviewees, particularly those from Thailand, saw alternative paths that involved the 
South as ‘nano-innovators’, actively contributing to nanotechnology’s global trajectory. 
Nearly one-third of interviewees from both Australia and Thailand specifically referred 
to nanotechnology providing ‘opportunities’ or holding ‘potential’ for Southern 
innovation [37, 39-41, 46, 49, 59-61]. In fact, some even suggested that Southern 
countries actually “…have the advantage” in terms of nanotechnology innovation [48] 
and that, on the back of various technologies, the South would “be at the same level” as 
the developed countries at some future stage [60]. In this section I provide supporting 
arguments for many of these claims. 
Two elements, each of which I will explore in this section, contribute to the 
argument that the South can play an active role in global nanotechnology innovation. 
The first element is that early signs of Southern nanotechnology commitment could set 
a platform for more active engagement in global innovation, including hope for 
engagement that includes some of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In this 
respect, interviewees also outlined constraints as to the kind of nanotechnology activity 
that might be possible. The second element is the suggestion that Southern countries 
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might be able to overcome a number of the previously raised barriers and challenges to 
developing innovative capabilities. 
Interviewees introduced the issue of Southern nanotechnology commitment by 
citing nine developing countries active in nanotechnology R&D and commenting on 
the strength of each country’s commitment. China was the one Southern country 
presented as a playing a most active role in nanotechnology and was often grouped 
with the North, given it is “…moving so fast and putting so many resources into 
nanotechnology…” [47]. Warris noted that “…China had the highest ratio [of 
nanoscience compared to their total science] in the world”, highlighting that it had 
identified nanotechnology as an area of increasing importance [45]. Following China, 
India, South Korea and South Africa were all seen as playing highly active roles ahead 
of Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia who were viewed as 
playing moderately active roles. Although Tegart saw the Phillipines, Vietnam and 
Indonesia as “much further behind” there was chance for strong presence from these 
three [37]. As Tanthapanitchakoon noted, there is a lot of enthusiasm in a country such 
as Vietnam where the government are “very keen to promote their nanotechnology 
program”, in order to “catch up” [47]. 
Thailand provides an interesting case given it is a ‘middle-range’ developing 
country seeking to make its mark in global nanotechnology innovation. Both Tegart 
and Turney spoke about the willingness and drive from Thailand to harness 
nanotechnology through the development of innovative capabilities [37, 48]. Thai 
interviewees confirmed the strong desire and ambitions, with Pothsiri noting that the 
Thai government’s policy is “…to promote this kind of innovation to be… something 
that we would be able to do by ourselves….” [66]. Arya said that the Thai 
government’s hopes are actually targeted at ensuring nanotechnology contributes up to 
one per cent of the Thai Gross Domestic Product in the coming ten years [38]. 
Strategically, given its central location amongst South East Asian nations, Thailand is 
seeking to be a “hub” for nanotechnology [41], with Tegart positive that Thailand 
could be among the leaders in South East Asia if it receives strong government support 
[37]. 
Both interviewees and practitioners saw government support and ‘endorsement’ 
for nanotechnology as real strengths for Thailand. Pothsiri, speaking about the Thai 
nanotechnology climate said that “right now the chance is quite good [to build 
capacity] because there is a policy commitment from the government” [66]. 
Interviewees said that the policy commitment had already resulted in initial funding, 
with Damrongchai adding that there is enough money available to make a substantial 
investment in nanotechnology R&D [39]. In addition to early funding, interviewees 
mentioned the establishment of a national nanotechnology centre and the earmarking of 
specific agencies to drive nanotechnology forward [66]. Interviewees also noted that 
this policy commitment was translating into support for nanotechnology across a 
number of sectors. Thajchayapong highlighted examples from his own experiences 
with the Ministries of Commerce and Defence: 
…two weeks ago, I was delighted that I was invited by [the] Ministry of 
Commerce Permanent Secretary and I was explaining to them about 
nanotechnology, in front of 150 or 200 people… [similarly, at] the military 
school, they had about 150 student[s] listening to nanotechnology… [62]. 
However, interviewees were quick to highlight that these developments all 
stemmed from the Thai Prime Minister who was pinpointed as the main driving force 
for nanotechnology in Thailand [39, 42, 63, 68]. Turney more explicitly noted that “the 
Prime Minister is actually driving this, personally, as something he wants to see 
happen” [48], with  Tanthapanichakoon adding that the Prime Minister individually 
realised the importance of emerging technology, such as nanotechnology, for 
Thailand’s future [47]. Thajyapong, highlighting the importance of political leadership 
in a country such as Thailand, outlined the circumstances in which the Prime Minister 
initiated Thailand’s first serious foray into nanotechnology: 
…about two years ago he [the Prime Minister] went to the science park. He 
visited us and he was surprised. He used the words to the effect, ‘I did not 
realise that you have done so much’ and then he mentioned about 
nanotechnology. And that is how we say, ‘o.k., if Prime Minister use the word 
nanotechnology we have to respond’ and we set up the centre [62]. 
Thailand’s high level of commitment, combined with the previously mentioned 
nanotechnology activity in other countries, suggests the existence of foundations upon 
which Southern countries could play active roles in global nanotechnology innovation. 
A few of the Australian interviewees admitted surprise at the early nanotechnology 
capabilities in some of the developing and transitional countries [37, 54]. Braach-
Myksvitis saw the “early start” from developing countries as something new in the 
science and technology arena [54]. In this respect, Cooper said that nano-innovation 
does not have to follow the same distributive pattern as biotechnology innovation, 
believing that early widespread engagement “…totally changes the picture” [56]. In 
presenting hopeful visions of Southern countries playing active roles in global 
nanotechnology innovation, some referred to other Southern successes such as the 
development of the Indian pharmaceutical industry in the 1970s that produced cheap 
drugs geared at local needs [56] and South Africa’s recent ability to build a critical 
mass of scientific researchers [65]. 
Although the examples presented thus far mainly deal with the more advanced 
developing countries, there was a belief that the nanotechnology revolution could 
extend to the LDCs or ‘very poor countries’ [57, 60]. Charinpanitkul, who assessed 
Thailand’s nanotechnology capabilities in 2004, said that countries like Laos could be 
conducting nanotechnology research within 5 years [41].  
However, interviewees also placed limitations on the scope and nature of 
nanotechnology activity that might be possible in some Southern countries. 
In terms of scope, there was a belief that Southern countries might only be able to 
engage with nanotechnology innovation at certain stages of the R&D cycle. Although 
Sawanpanyalert did not see Southern countries as necessarily able to work on ‘early-
stage’ nanotechnology research, he said that there are opportunities for ‘later research’ 
[43]. In this respect, Southern innovation was seen as dependent on partnerships with 
the North [43, 48, 49], particularly in an area such as drug development where 
developing countries “cannot do it alone” and will require “assistance from developed 
countries” [49]. Dutta pointed to countries such as Switzerland and Sweden as partners 
for components of the R&D phases that cannot be completed in Thailand [60]. 
However, Braach-Maksvytis, harking back to the way nanotechnology is 
perceived, noted that the scope of a country’s contribution to global nanotechnology 
innovation “…depends on what end of the scale you are talking about” [54]. Low-tech 
scale production of nanopowders for cosmetics, plastics and the polishing of silicon 
chips could be globally widespread and developed entirely within the South [54], 
whilst “niche products for which you need very high investments” might remain 
outputs from  the North [60]. 
In terms of the nature of nanotechnology research, the ability to conduct both 
fundamental and applied scientific research across all fields, was seen as beyond many 
of the Southern countries [38]. Arya explained this situation in greater detail, in the 
Thai context: 
…Thailand is not in a good position to compete at the fundamental research 
level. We do not have the capacity, we do not have the potential. So, whereas 
we can do some fundamental research for nanomaterials or nanotechnology, 
we have to look, more, at the applied research. [38]. 
As shall be explored in a future paper, the need to focus on applied research was 
closely followed by a need for Southern countries to find their own niche areas of 
application, building on niche knowledge [38, 69]. 
As alluded to in section 2.2, a range of capacity issues contribute to determining a 
countries’ level of engagement with nanotechnology [41, 43]. Nonetheless, arguments 
were made in six areas for why Southern countries might be able to overcome some of 
the previously raised barriers and challenges to developing innovative capabilities. 
2.3.1 Availability and Demand of Human Resources 
The first argument related to the level of available human resources to drive 
nanotechnology R&D. With respect to the Thai situation, Tanthapanichakoon noted 
that, from the outset, the Prime Minister demanded particular effort in the area of 
“human resources development in nanotechnology” [47]. The general belief was that 
Thailand possesses an adequate workforce to commence nanotechnology R&D 
initiatives [39], with an estimated number of “not less than 100 researchersxiv… [and] 
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nearly twenty laboratories that have been working on nanotechnology, scattered around 
[the] universities” [62].  
These views are coupled with a belief that nanotechnology might not require a big 
labour force [44] – that a small number of scientists, with differing backgrounds but 
unified in their focus on nanotechnology “can be quite a big force” [49]. The 
implication is that countries could consider nanotechnology innovation even if they 
only had a few researchers in nanotechnology-related fields [45]. Lynksey, although 
previously sceptical about the hopes for endogenous innovation, said that getting a 
‘critical mass’ is possible for countries that have a credible, political approach - even 
some of the LDCs, although this would be “….a couple of generations away” [65]. 
Yuthavong agreed, stating that Thailand can develop a critical mass of scientists “if it 
gets the right policy and right directives” [49]. 
Furthermore, discussing nanotechnology with some of the Thai interviewees 
unearthed a surprising number of people who claimed that they, or their colleagues, had 
been working in nanotechnology for many years. This was coupled with a belief that, 
in Thailand, a number of things have already been done on the nanoscale [69]. 
Charinpanitkul, who produced Thailand’s first national assessment of nanotechnology 
capabilities, cited Thai quantum dot research before the 1990s and, more recently, 
carbon nanotube research from the late 1990s [41]. Surveyed practitioners claimed to 
have been working in nanotechnology for an average of 6.2 years, with some claiming 
as much as 14 years. To explain this, some interviewees referred to support for 
‘nanotechnology’ as a recent Thai phenomenon: 
…back 10 years or more… I was studying in that field [nanotechnology] and 
researching the molecular assembly of molecules… but at that time the 
environment in Thailand was not very supportive of doing research into 
nanotechnology… [39]. 
In this light, Damrongchai believed that Thailand has enough workers with the 
appropriate skills and experience to seriously engage in nanotechnology innovation 
[39]. Songsivilai added that the diverse backgrounds of the Thai scientific workforce 
are an advantage in terms of the skill-sets nanotechnology R&D requires [69]. In 
further support, my assessment of Thai practitioners who claimed to be working in 
nanotechnology showed a highly qualified workforce, with nearly all having completed 
doctorates. Kanok-Nukulchai said that within three to five years someone in Thailand 
will receive a Masters or PhD degree in nanotechnology [42]. In the broader context of 
Southern countries, Berwick suggested that  “…[a] mastery of the basic principles of 
nanotechnology can be applied across the board…” [46]. 
2.3.2 Infrastructure 
In addition to the hopes of addressing human resource barriers, interviewees suggested 
nanotechnology could bypass some of the infrastructural challenges commonly 
associated with many emerging technologies. Dutta suggested that developing 
bionanotechnology applications, for example, does not necessarily need an extensive 
biotechnology centre [60]. Similarly, Radt claimed that nanotechnology “could 
transform any developing country to catch up with the scientific communities [sic]” 
considering that, in an area such as drug development, it does not necessarily rely on 
“very expensive and long-lasting studies” [64]. 
Additionally, some interviewees challenged the belief that nanotechnology R&D 
requires special instrumentation or world class facilities, claiming, rather, that many 
developing countries have much of the standard instrumentation that is needed [60, 64]. 
With these points in mind, Radt distinguished nanotechnology from the capital 
intensive nature of the previously emergent computer chip industry that needed “big 
clean rooms, big plant[s]… [and] a lot of extremely expensive instruments to start” 
[64]. 
Furthermore, interviewees believed that nanotechnology R&D can utilise existing 
infrastructure and previous approaches “…because nanotechnology is based on the 
basic sciences: chemistry, biology and engineering…” [64]. With similar thoughts in 
mind, interviewees presented nanotechnology as a “natural progression” for Thailand, 
given its background in biotechnology research [43, 47]. Thus, interviewees often 
spoke of nanotechnology R&D as merely a modification or “upgrading” of existing 
activities and infrastructure [66]. As Chirachanchai noted, “…what we have now, we 
can apply it but just change the point of view from ‘trial and error’ to understanding at 
the molecular level” [59]. Coyle suggested that, although “the terms may be new…”, it 
is, in fact, putting into effect much existing knowledge, with a new emphasis on the 
way to do things [50]. In this respect, Chiranchanchai said it is actually more a matter 
of identifying people’s roles and that the infrastructure will naturally develop when 
people come together [59]. 
2.3.3 International Knowledge 
Building on the argument that nanotechnology can utilise existing infrastructure, 
interviewees presented a strong belief that developing countries can “leapfrog” their 
R&D capabilities and position within global innovation [38, 45-47, 49, 54, 60, 64-66, 
68]. When interviewees referred to ‘leapfrogging’, they spoke of utilising existing 
knowledge and research efforts by scientists in other countries, learning “…from what 
has already been done…” [46] in order to adapt and extend the lessons learnt [59]. Thai 
interviewees, in particular, saw opportunities for countries to “jumpstart” their R&D 
activities [57], avoiding the need to start from “square one” [47, 57]. But Braach-
Maksvytis said that the potential for Southern countries to leapfrog in nanotechnology 
innovation also paves the way for a new trajectory, whereby countries could “steer a 
new, emerging science area into a very real and very practical outcome” [54]. Braach-
Maksvytis elaborated: 
…rather than going down the track of implementing technologies and devices 
that developed countries have now and then just repeating that, to actually 
look beyond already and use the new worlds that new technologies open up 
[54]. 
The ability to leverage global nanotechnology developments was seen as a major 
positive for a country such as Thailand [37, 38, 45, 58]. Tanthapanichakoon expressed 
the Thai thinking that there is no need to “…reinvent the wheel… we want to know 
what the world has and what kinds of existing technologies we might make use of in 
order not to start from scratch” [47]. This is made all the more easy given, “…a lot of 
papers can get translated, [and] put on  the Internet a lot quicker now…” [46]. 
Furthermore, there was a belief from Thai nanotechnology practitioners that, because 
nanotechnology is ‘new’ and not yet well defined, it is not too difficult to catch up, 
with Dutta adding that Thailand’s ‘late’ start “does not necessarily mean that we have 
lost anything…” [60]. 
On the contrary, Kanok-Nuckulchai suggested that the very nature of 
backwardness means that ‘falling behind’ in nanotechnology may not be such a big 
issue for some countries “because they can wait until the leading country develop[s] 
these technologies and they can follow” [44]. In fact, in looking to leap ahead, the 
South’s ‘backwardness’ in nanotechnology R&D was even viewed as potentially 
advantageous in terms of saving “time and money” [60]. 
There was a general recognition that support and cooperation from the North can 
be useful in Southern efforts to ‘catch up’. In this respect, Turney noted early signs of 
Northern support for Southern nanotechnology programs, highlighting the case of 
Japan that is currently “…funding educational programs within countries like Malaysia 
and Thailand” [48]. In this instance, Turney saw the net benefit as a flexible, highly-
skilled workforce from which all countries can benefit [48]. 
2.3.4 Research and Development Costs 
Whilst entry costs were previously raised as a barrier for Southern innovation, many 
saw nanotechnology offering “a door for countries into research even if they do not 
have as large funding bodies as perhaps highly developed countries” [64]. In addition 
to the benefits outlined in 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, Ford said that there is considerable 
potential for Southern innovation “…for the simple reason that a lot of nanotechnology 
is extremely cheap”[61]. Some interviewees agreed that big budgets are not necessary 
to commence working in nanotechnology [59], as highlighted by the Thai situation 
where the initial budget of 6 million bahtxv was “…enough, at that stage” [62]. 
However, it is important to note that low budgets do not necessarily equate to 
‘low-end’ nanotechnology in terms of the sophistication of R&D output. Rather, many 
nanotechnology approaches allow “…very useful and high-impact experiments with 
relatively small budgets…” [64]. For example, given it utilises natural chemical 
reactions, self-assembly was seen as a potentially inexpensive means by which the 
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 approximately equivalent to $165,000. 
South could play an active role in cutting-edge nanotechnology innovation [59, 69]. As 
Radt noted with nanotechnology-based drug delivery systems: 
…most of the nanotechnological systems are self-assembling systems, 
therefore, often it is possible to simply put reactants together in the right 
order… it is possible to produce these systems in parallel in a large scale… 
self assembling systems are easy to scale-up and that is why they are 
potentially useful and cheaper [64]. 
In addition to cost reductions for drug development arising from chemical self-
assembly, Chirachanchai saw nanotherapeutics as potentially inexpensive because 
increased molecular understanding, combined with advances in simulation, would 
minimise the need for ‘trial-and-error’ research [59].  
A number of these cost-cutting factors contributed to Dutta referring to what he 
termed “poor man’s nanotechnology” [60], whereby nanotechnology could offer entry 
points to cater for all sorts of residual Southern capacity: 
If I think about a country like Laos… it is lacking resources… I would suggest 
that, ‘look I am doing nanotechnology the poor man’s way’… I am using 
colloidal nanoparticles and trying to find out applications of each ones. Laos 
could possibly also concentrate on things like this [60]. 
2.3.5 Comparative Advantage 
Low costs are also assisted by traditional and new means of comparative advantage. 
Advantages were said to revolve around traditionally proposed areas, such as the low 
costs of labour, easy access to clinical trial participants and natural resource abundance. 
However, a number of advantages were suggested as specifically relating to 
nanotechnology. Thai nanotechnology practitioners directly referred to their 
nanotechnology research utilising local biological products and raw materials, such as 
herbal products with natural resource bases [41, 47]. According to one practitioner, the 
link to resources also included the ability to produce nanomaterials from local 
materials. This was seen as a potential cost-saving advantage for a country like 
Thailand, with Chiranchanchai suggesting that if Thailand produces a nanoscale 
product, such as a base for drug delivery, “…the products, compared to other countries, 
may be cheap if we use our natural abundance for that” [59]. 
2.3.6 Private Sector Support 
In terms of some of the capacity matters raised in section 2.2, Damrongchai challenged 
the belief that researcher retention would be an issue for a country such as Thailand, 
saying that there are enough researchers who would want to remain in Thailand [39]. 
There was also a belief that the early signs in Thailand suggest adequate private sector 
support for nanotechnology. According to some, industry is showing early interest in 
nanotechnology [41, 62], signalling a positive change in perceptions amongst Thai 
businesses that now see it as a “promising field” [41] that is resulting in the emergence 
of nanotechnology entrepreneurs [48]. 
In this light, although Tanthapanichakoon agreed that Thailand faced technology 
transfer challenges and did not have any industrial productsxvi, he noted that some 
product samples and prototypes are being produced in labs [47]. Tanthapanichakoon 
added that the commercialisation stage of mass production was probably another two to 
three years away [47]. 
Conclusion 
My initial research shows the existence of two, slightly different ‘nano-divides’. The 
‘nano-innovation divide’ relates to where nanotechnology knowledge is generated and 
retained, whilst the ‘nano-orientation divide’ relates to where nanotechnology research 
is targeted. The nano-innovation divide is the platform on which the nano-orientation 
divide is determined. Early levels of nanotechnology funding in the North appear to be 
driving the innovation divide, which is framed in the absolute terms of: countries that 
lead R&D and those that are ‘left behind’. In this sense, the nano-innovation divide was 
negatively viewed, with no one raising the possibility that the divide might be a good 
thing, either for the world in terms of maintaining an effective international division of 
labor or, perhaps more importantly, for a country in terms of it entirely averting 
engagement with nano-innovation. This suggests an immediate mainstreaming of 
nanotechnology debates into a competitive, nationalistic ‘growth’ narrative that leaves 
little space for post-development critiques or notions of alternative trajectories. 
In terms of new possibilities for Southern dependency, fears were held for an 
increasing concentration of proprietary knowledge in the North, reinforcing and 
inequitable intellectual property regimen and accelerating the global division of labour. 
Compounding these issues are the proposed capacity challenges facing a country’s 
efforts to develop endogenous nanotechnology capabilities. Although most of these 
challenges do not appear exclusive to nanotechnology, some key informants perceive 
them as inhibitive for Southern engagement in global innovation. 
However, it would appear likely that nanotechnology also creates new potential for 
Southern innovation. There was a strong belief that nanotechnology innovation is 
misperceived as being beyond the capacity of developing countries. This was supported 
by reference to the early levels of Southern nanotechnology awareness and 
commitment, and subsequently raised the possibility that Least Developed Countries 
could become active in global nanotechnology innovation. However, interviewees 
noted that the possibilities were constrained in terms of the scope and nature of 
                                                           
xvi Although Panitchpakdi claimed Thailand has already produced a nanoscale 
diagnostic kit [55]. 
nanotechnology activity that might be possible in some Southern countries. In 
particular, there are significant differences in potential ‘scale’; from those countries’ 
where nanotechnology innovation might occur on a relatively small scale and be 
targeted towards a certain phase in the R&D process, to those for whom the scale of 
nanotechnology innovation is more broadly encompassing and comparable to R&D 
efforts in the North. Although some are generic, most of the factors raised in arguments 
supporting the ability for Southern countries to engage in nanotechnology innovation 
relate specifically to nanotechnology. 
Overall, Australian interviewees were more likely to consider Southern 
nanotechnology within a global context of external challenges to building endogenous 
capacity, identifying market-dictated challenges, such as the orientation of 
nanotechnology research and development, its cost and its availability, as well as other 
structural barriers relating to the global patent system. From this perspective, the 
development ‘problem’ is seen to include global institutions in the North, implying that 
any positive, sustainable alteration of the divides’ trajectory must address international 
imbalances in systems of trade as well as other structural inequalities. 
Thai interviewees were more likely to consider nanotechnology within a domestic 
context of internal challenges to building endogenous capacity. They identified 
capacity issues such as developing adequate human resources and technical 
infrastructure, as well as ensuring political support and appropriate financing. From this 
perspective, the development ‘problem’ is seen more as a result of Southern inabilities, 
with Southern countries viewed as ‘backward’ or ‘lagging’ and needing to ‘catch-up’. 
My research has reinforced the critical influence of how nanotechnology is 
perceived in terms of debates on how it will unfold. Building on the findings of 
previous research [7], interviewees commonly made arguments based on fluid 
definitions for nanotechnology and the possibilities it raises. This point explains a 
number of apparent contradictions, particularly in areas such as nanotechnology’s 
infrastructural and cost requirements, where interviewees presented an unusually wide 
range of views. The conflicting views also raise the interesting question as to the role 
of hype in nanotechnology discourse. 
Equity is a central ethical issue in the international debates around 
nanotechnology. However, current thinking, as supported by this research, suggests 
that greater equity can only occur on a platform of more widespread nano-innovation, 
where nations become more globally competitive. Ultimately, this thinking limits 
subsequent debates to a narrative underpinned by the contested philosophies of 
‘sustainable economic development’ and denies the many, creative alternatives 
emerging worldwide. 
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